

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING: BRIDGING THE
STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND THE ACTIVITY ANNEX

By

Denise Ridgway, Lt Col, USAF

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____
18 May 2001

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

Faculty Advisor: _____
Professor David Chandler
Joint Military Operations Department

20011018 067

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

2. Security Classification Authority:

3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:

4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.

5. Name of Performing Organization:

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

6. Office Symbol:

C

7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

686 CUSHING ROAD

NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207

8. Title (Include Security Classification): THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING: BRIDGING THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND THE ACTIVITY ANNEX (UNCLASSIFIED)

9. Personal Authors: Lt Col Denise Ridgway, USAF

10. Type of Report: FINAL

11. Date of Report: 18 May 2001

12. Page Count: 21

12A Paper Advisor (if any): Professor David Chandler

13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

14. Ten key words that relate to your paper:

Theater Engagement, Peacetime Engagement, Military Engagement, Regional Engagement, Strategic Concept, Activity Annex, Regional Objectives, Security Environment, Analytic Hierarchy Process, Military Professionalism

15. Abstract:

Each geographic combatant commander is tasked to develop a formal written plan, called a Theater Engagement Plan (TEP), which identifies the military engagement activities that the command will execute over the next seven years. The two key components of a TEP are the Strategic Concept (objectives, strategic environment, etc.) and the Activity Annex (specific activities to be executed). The Joint Staff developed formal guidance for the commands on what should be in the Strategic Concept and Activity Annex and what they should look like. However, the formal guidance does not include any information on how to translate the Strategic Concept into specific military activity requirements.

This paper presents a rigorous methodology to help command planners think through the inherently subjective process of theater engagement planning. This methodology utilizes an analytical hierarchy process-based computer tool that enables the planner to build a decision framework that incorporates priorities, needs, and subjective assessments. The output of the methodology is a prioritized listing of the military engagement activities that will best contribute to accomplishment of the CINC's objectives. A planner will then have the rational foundation to optimally allocate scarce military engagement activity resources across the theater and justify the command's requirements.

16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:

Unclassified

X

Same As Rpt

DTIC Users

17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

Abstract

THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING: BRIDGING THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND THE ACTIVITY ANNEX

Each geographic combatant commander is tasked to develop a formal written plan, called a Theater Engagement Plan (TEP), which identifies the military engagement activities that the command will execute over the next seven years. The two key components of a TEP are the Strategic Concept (objectives, strategic environment, etc.) and the Activity Annex (specific activities to be executed). The Joint Staff developed formal guidance for the commands on what should be in the Strategic Concept and Activity Annex and what they should look like. However, the formal guidance does not include any information on how to translate the Strategic Concept into specific military activity requirements.

This paper presents a rigorous methodology to help command planners think through the inherently subjective process of theater engagement planning. This methodology utilizes an analytical hierarchy process-based computer tool that enables the planner to build a decision framework that incorporates priorities, needs, and subjective assessments. The output of the methodology is a prioritized listing of the military engagement activities that will best contribute to accomplishment of the CINC's objectives. A planner will then have the rational foundation to optimally allocate scarce military engagement activity resources across the theater and justify the command's requirements.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. National Security Strategy includes the element of “Shaping the International Environment” as a way to accomplish the national goals of enhancing security, promoting prosperity, and promoting democracy and human rights.ⁱ The U.S. military has long been a tool for shaping the international environment in peacetime through regional engagement activities like exercises, training deployments, or humanitarian assistance. Only recently, however, have geographical combatant commanders (CINCs) been tasked to develop formal written plans to “link CINC-planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives.”ⁱⁱ These plans are called Theater Engagement Plans (TEPs). The Joint Staff has developed written guidance (CJCSM 3113.01A) that “sets forth guidelines and procedures for the geographic CINCs and Executive Agents to develop Theater Engagement Plans.”ⁱⁱⁱ However, the reality is that the joint guidance tells the CINCs *what* to develop (components of a TEP), and *when* to develop it, but not *how* to develop it. This paper will address the ‘how’ question by proposing a rigorous, but simple, methodology that a theater planning staff can utilize to help develop the TEP. The paper will first describe the Theater Engagement Plan in some detail and identify the key stumbling block to developing the plan, namely, the rational linkage of its two major components, the Strategic Concept and the Activity Annex. Next, it will generally describe the proposed methodology that will overcome that stumbling block and tie the two components together. Finally, the paper will utilize a specific country case study to walk through the methodology and illustrate its application.

THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANNING

The two major components of a Theater Engagement Plan are the Strategic Concept and the Activity Annex. The Strategic Concept is the foundation of the TEP and

includes the CINC's intent, prioritized regional and country objectives, and a general discussion of engagement activities.^{iv} The Activity Annex identifies the specific military activities, by country, that will be employed to accomplish the CINC's objectives.

The CINC pulls the prioritized regional objectives for the Strategic Concept out of the classified Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Some specific country objectives may be articulated in the JSCP, but country objectives are not generally included in the JSCP. It is the CINC's task to take the JSCP's regional objectives and then translate them into prioritized objectives for each country in his geographical area of responsibility. The Strategic Concept also includes an assessment of the security environment in the theater, to include political, economic, and military factors.^v Finally, the Strategic Concept includes a general description of how the CINC will use peacetime military engagement activities to shape the theater.^{vi}

The Activity Annex provides a detailed breakout, by country and year, of the military engagement activities required in the theater for the next seven years. The Annex also categorizes the engagement activities according to type: operational activity, combined exercises, security assistance, combined training, combined education, military contacts, and humanitarian assistance.

So how does a planner bridge the gap between country objectives and military activities? That is, how does the planner decide that employing military activity X will enable the command to accomplish country objective Y? Furthermore, what guides the planner in allocating scarce engagement resources (military activities) across the theater to ensure the United States gets the 'most bang for its buck'? Without a rigorous methodology for developing specific, prioritized military activity requirements for each country, the planner is forced to use methods that don't provide the analytical underpinning to explain and defend resource requirements and allocation.^{vii} Those non-

rigorous methods include selecting military activities for a particular country because 'that's what we've always done there and it seems to work.' It includes the selection of military activities because 'that's what the host nation wants.' Finally, it includes the somewhat random selection of military activities off a menu simply because 'that's what's usually available'. While these factors can certainly be used as inputs to the decision making process, none of them ensures that U.S. objectives for the host nation are rigorously considered and serve as the primary drivers for the derivation of prioritized military activity requirements for that country. This paper addresses the challenge of tying objectives to activities in a rigorous way to ensure the planners have a rational analytical foundation for allocating scarce military activity resources across the theater.

PROPOSED METHODOLOGY

This paper proposes a methodology for linking country objectives and military activities. The methodology utilizes a computer decision making tool to help the planner methodically build a weighted decision framework that incorporates expert subjective assessments. The weighted decision framework allows the planner to compare alternative solutions to a problem and produce a prioritized listing of the best solutions. This methodology, as applied to development of a TEP, produces an output that is a prioritized ranking of military activities according to their potential contribution to accomplishing specific country objectives.

Use of computer tools to aid theater planners is not a new concept. In the early 1990s, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) used a tool called the Regional Security Strategy Implementation Analysis (RSSIA) to "evaluate key socioeconomic and stability indicators and examine conditions that make significant impact on a region."^{viii} This tool incorporated both qualitative and quantitative assessments to produce a relative ranking of the countries in the region in terms of overall economic and political stability and

potential. RSSIA was used effectively in development of SOUTHCOM's theater strategy but was discontinued after a change in leadership.

The decision making tool that this methodology will use is called Expert Choice.^{ix} Expert Choice is an inexpensive computer software package that is simple to use and runs on a standard desktop computer system. It was chosen for this methodology because it is used in the Naval War College's Executive Decision Making Course. Expert Choice is based on a mathematically based theory called Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) that allows the user to incorporate both empirical data and subjective judgments into a decision framework.^x "The AHP assists with the decision making process by allowing decision makers to organize and evaluate the importance of various criteria and the alternative solutions to a decision."^{xi} It should be noted that, even though Expert Choice was chosen here, any AHP-based computer software tool (there are several) can provide planners with the necessary analytical capability to implement the methodology.

In this methodology, I will use the Expert Choice tool to analyze a specific country objective by first breaking the objective down into its relevant criteria and weighting the criteria according to their relative value to the objective. Then the methodology will evaluate the alternative solutions and weight them according to their relative value to each criterion. In this case, the alternative solutions are the military activities that could be selected for use in that country. In essence, the methodology creates a hierarchical decision framework that allows the planner to incorporate subjective assessments about the objective and the military activities. The output of the methodology will be a prioritized ranking of military activities according to their potential contribution to accomplishment of the specific country objective.

CASE STUDY

The best way to clearly illustrate the methodology is to use a realistic case study and actually apply the methodology to produce a result. For this paper, I've chosen to use Guatemala as the case study country. As part of SOUTHCOM's Theater Engagement Plan, the Strategic Concept identifies the specific country objectives for Guatemala. The Activity Annex identifies the specific military engagement activities that SOUTHCOM will employ in Guatemala for the next seven years. The challenge for the planner, of course, is to rationally link the two; that is, to figure out which military engagement activities should be employed to best accomplish the CINC's objectives for Guatemala. Because country objectives in TEPs are often classified, I've chosen to use a *notional* objective of "Professionalize the Guatemalan military" for this case study rather than an actual objective pulled from the Strategic Concept. However, this notional objective is a reasonable example to use in illustrating the methodology. Guatemala has just emerged from a 36-year civil war (settled with the guerillas at the peace table in 1996) and has an intermittent history of military-led governments. From the U.S. perspective, it is certainly in the best interests of our national goals for the theater (security, prosperity, democracy and human rights) that Guatemala has a professional military. The alternative solutions that will be evaluated in this case study are the military engagement activities that could potentially contribute to the professionalization of the Guatemalan military: combined exercises, military-to-military contacts, training deployments, professional military education, security assistance, and humanitarian/civic assistance.

STEP ONE: SELECT APPROPRIATE CRITERIA FOR THE OBJECTIVE


The first step is to take the country objective and break it down into its relevant criteria. In the case study, that means identifying the criteria that contribute to a

professional military. It should be noted, of course, that the identification of what contributes to a “professional military” is done from a U.S. perspective, and thus uses the U.S. military as the role model. Because there is no standard reference list of what criteria define a professional military, this paper presents a notional list. This is the first example of how a planner’s subjective assessment is incorporated into the decision framework, and the strength of the methodology is that it allows for such subjectivity.

I’ve selected five criteria that, I believe, define a “professional military.” The first criterion is respect for human rights. This means that the military has a culture that is not only respectful of individual rights, but also holds its personnel accountable for violations of human rights. The second criterion is subordination of the military to civilian authority. This means that the military willingly supports a civilian-led government and does not subvert civilian authority, either through attempts to overthrow the government or through simple disobedience. The third criterion is training. This means that the military has a formal training program that develops initial and advanced skills within its force. The fourth criterion is appropriate roles and missions. This means that the military is serving in a role that is appropriate to that country and “makes sense in their own national security context.”^{xii} It also means that the military is filling a legitimate role as perceived by the host nation’s citizens and has earned their trust. The last criterion is organization, meaning that the size and structure of the military is appropriate to its role and missions. It also means that the military has a viable non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps and has a system of advancement based on merit. Once the planner has identified the objective and its relevant criteria, he can build the first two levels of the decision framework. Figure 1 shows the first two levels of the decision framework for

the case study.

Figure 1.



FIRST TWO LEVELS OF DECISION FRAMEWORK

As one can see, the selection of appropriate criteria for this objective was actually independent of the specific country selected for the case study. The significance of the specific country selected becomes apparent in Step Two of the methodology.

STEP TWO: WEIGHT THE CRITERIA ACCORDING TO NEED

The next step is to take the five criteria that contribute to a professional military and weight them according to their relative contribution to the objective in a specific country. In the case study, that means the planner must evaluate Guatemala's military and assess its level of progress for each of the five criteria. This assessment is, of course, subjective and should be accomplished by the Guatemalan experts: country team and SOUTHCOM desk officers. After assessing the status of the Guatemalan military for each criterion, the planner assigns a weight to each.

The Expert Choice tool allows the planner to use any weighting scale he wants, but the scale must be applied uniformly to each criterion. For this case study, I've chosen to use a weighting scale of 1-10. A weight of "1" means that the Guatemalan military has

already achieved a high level of progress in that criterion and the U.S. should not put additional emphasis (resources) toward that area. Since we're evaluating progress from a U.S. perspective, our military is the standard and would therefore be scored as a "1". A weight of "10" means that the Guatemalan military has achieved little to no progress in that criterion and the U.S. should put additional emphasis toward that area.

As mentioned above, the assessment and weighting of the criteria for a country should be accomplished by a country expert. In this case, I've drawn upon the expertise of an officer currently in SOUTHCOM to get a first-hand assessment of the Guatemalan military.^{xiii} That officer's weighting of each criterion is described below.

Respect for Human Rights: (3) There is a great deal of respect for human rights in the current Guatemalan military. In fact, most Guatemalan officers want to be treated with respect for their current abilities and not be tarnished with an image associated with the pre-1996 Guatemalan military. There is accountability for violations of human rights by military personnel. Furthermore, SOUTHCOM is not aware of any recent violations.


Subordination to civilian authority: (3) The military has been apolitical for the past 12 years. Guatemalan military officers have stated that they have no interest in becoming involved in national politics. They have also expressed their desire to become a more professional and credible military, and recognize that political involvement is the antithesis of a professional military. The Guatemalan military actively supported a recent resolution to change the Guatemalan constitution to require a civilian, vice military, Minister of Defense.^{xiv}

Training: (8) The Guatemalan military needs to develop better doctrine and modernize its forces. Currently, there are few resources devoted to formal training programs in the Guatemalan military.

Appropriate roles/missions: (4) The 1996 Peace Accords emphasized the transition of the Guatemalan military to a force focused on external, vice internal, security. Though the external threat is negligible, this emphasis was necessary in order to assure the populace that the 36-year civil war was really over and the military was no longer a threat. However, Guatemalan military forces have been sometimes teamed up with police to patrol streets due to the high criminal threat and the understaffing of police forces.

Organization: (6) The Guatemalan Defense Ministry has expressed its intent to downsize the military, but has not yet begun to do so. There is a system of advancement by merit that includes boards and written tests. There is not currently a viable NCO corps in the Guatemalan military but military leaders have expressed a desire to develop one. In addition, Guatemala is beginning to integrate women into their military with the graduation of their first female cadets in June of 2001.

Figure 2 is the first two levels of the decision framework for the case study with the criterion weightings assigned by the country expert.




FIRST TWO LEVELS WITH CRITERIA WEIGHTINGS

STEP THREE: EVALUATE THE MILITARY ACTIVITY OPTIONS

The third step in the methodology is to identify and evaluate the military activity options, thus completing the development of the hierarchical decision framework. The military engagement activities that will be evaluated in this case study are the activities that could potentially contribute to the professionalization of the Guatemalan military: combined exercises, military-to-military contacts, training deployments, professional military education, security assistance, and humanitarian/civic assistance. These are the military activities identified in Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*; however, I've used slightly different definitions for some in order to avoid overlap. For example, Joint Pub 3-07 delineates training as a separate activity but also includes training under its definition of security assistance. In building this decision framework, it is important to keep redundancy and overlap out of the options.

The completed decision framework without weightings is shown in Figure 3. As one can see, this methodology produced a three-level framework where Level 1 is the country objective, Level 2 contains the objective's criteria, and Level 3 contains the military engagement activity options.

Figure 3.



COMPLETED DECISION FRAMEWORK

Combined exercises include both bilateral and multilateral exercises involving larger units, typically battalion-sized and above. Examples of exercises include SOUTHCOM's UNITAS exercise with multiple Latin American navies, and the FUERTES CAMINOS exercise involving large numbers of combat support and combat service support troops. Combined exercises potentially involve and influence large numbers of host nation personnel, but they are typically short in duration, usually 1-2 weeks long. They have the potential to increase interoperability with host nation forces and the readiness of host nation forces.

Military-to-military contacts include conferences and other high-level talks, VIP visits, officer exchanges, and assignment of attaches. Examples of this activity are the annual Inter-American Naval Conference, which serves as a regional policy forum,^{xv} and the conference on "The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas."^{xvi} Military-to-military contacts typically influence small numbers of personnel and are usually applicable to field-grade rank and above.

Training deployments include the use of U.S. military teams deployed overseas to train host nation units. An example would be a U.S. Air Force mobile training team deployed to a host nation to train aircraft maintenance technicians. It also includes the attendance of host nation personnel at specialized (usually technical) schools in the United States. An example would be the attendance of host nation enlisted navy personnel at the U.S. Navy's Small Craft Instructional and Technical Training School, NAVSCIATTS. Training deployments can provide a high level of personal interaction with host nation personnel and direct influence at the unit level. These deployments are usually of short duration.

Professional military education (PME) covers attendance by host nation personnel (both officer and NCO corps) at U.S. academies or PME courses. Examples are the Naval Command College at Newport (O-4 level) and the Air War College at Maxwell AFB (O-5/6 level). PME provides a longer duration opportunity for personal interaction with host nation personnel and can result in long-term personal and professional relationships between U.S. and host nation personnel. Even though PME impacts an extremely small number of host nation personnel, those individuals impacted are typically being groomed for high-level positions in their militaries.

Security Assistance (SA), for the purposes of this paper, includes only that assistance relating to equipment, including arms sales and transfers, direct commercial sales, and the disposal of excess U.S. defense articles. Security Assistance can tie the host nation military to the United States for long-term equipment support and thus increases the opportunities for future interaction. It also can increase the defense capabilities of the host nation and interoperability with U.S. military forces.

Humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) encompasses those actions that support the host nation by "promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive

institutions.”^{xvii} It includes support to develop public infrastructure, like construction of schools, clinics, and water wells. It also includes humanitarian assistance to the local population, especially in the areas of medical, dental, and veterinary treatment. It can also include efforts like training of de-mining personnel in the host nation. HCA activities can incorporate large numbers of host nation military personnel. They can improve the standard of living for the host nation populace, and have the added benefit of being visible to ordinary citizens. This can help increase the legitimacy of the host nation military in the eyes of its citizens by helping them meet the basic needs of the public.”^{xviii}

In order to determine a military engagement activity’s potential contribution to the country objective, the planner must first evaluate its potential contribution to each of the objective’s criteria and assign a weight. Once again, the Expert Choice tool allows the planner to use any scale he wants, but the scale must be applied uniformly to each military activity. For this case study, I’ve chosen to use a weighting scale of 1-10. A weight of “1” means that the military activity will potentially make little to no contribution to progress in the criterion. A weight of “10” means that the military activity has the potential to make a major contribution to progress in the criterion. I’ve used the word “potential” in this evaluation because the contribution of any military engagement activity to the accomplishment of U.S. objectives in a host nation is, of course, contingent upon the host nation using the military activity in a positive and constructive way to effect progress toward that objective. In other words, theater engagement “shaping” is not a unilateral process.

The evaluation and assignment of weightings for the military activities is a subjective process based primarily on military experience. “To be useful, the assessment process must be capable of addressing accurately the intangible, and admittedly subjective, aspects of shaping activities.”^{xix} The following section identifies each

criterion and the military activity weightings I've assigned based on my own experience and judgment.

Respect for human rights:

Combined exercises: 3
Military-to-military contacts: 4
Training: 6
PME: 3
Security assistance: 1
HCA: 6

Subordination to civilian authority

Combined exercises: 2
Military-to-military contacts: 8
Training: 4
PME: 9
Security assistance: 1
HCA: 1

Training

Combined exercises: 8
Military-to-military contacts: 2
Training: 10
PME: 5
Security assistance: 1
HCA: 2


Appropriate roles/missions

Combined exercises: 7
Military-to-military contacts: 5
Training: 7
PME: 5
Security assistance: 1
HCA: 6

Organization

Combined exercises: 3
Military-to-military contacts: 6
Training: 6
PME: 8
Security assistance: 1
HCA: 2

Figure 4 shows the completed decision framework with the weights assigned for each criterion and for each military activity.



STEP FOUR: APPLY THE EXPERT CHOICE TOOL TO PRODUCE A PRIORITIZED LIST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

The next step is for the planner to input the three levels of the completed decision framework and their weightings into the Expert Choice tool. The tool uses a pair-wise comparison process to mathematically calculate which military activities are weighted the highest relative to their contribution to the overall objective of professionalizing the Guatemalan military. The tool's output is simply a prioritized and weighted list of the military activities according to their potential to contribute to the country objective. For the case study, the Expert Choice tool produced the output shown in Figure 5. As one can see, the military activity that scored the highest in terms of its potential to contribute to professionalizing the Guatemalan military was training. Security assistance scored the lowest in terms of its potential contribution to this objective. The utility of the output is that it provides a rational basis on which to make decisions about the allocation of

engagement resources to Guatemala for this objective. In other words, the planner has now 'bridged' the Strategic Concept and Activity Annex.

Figure 5.

Objective: Professionalize Guatemalan Military (total weight = 1.0)
1) Training (.26)
2) PME (.22)
3) Combined Exercises (.19)
4) Military-to-Military (.17)
5) Humanitarian/Civic Assistance (.12)
6) Security Assistance (.04)


PRIORITIZED LIST OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

RECOMMENDATIONS

The methodology described in this paper provides a rigorous way to prioritize the military engagement activities that should be employed in order to accomplish a specific country objective. But the planner does not have to stop at the objective level. He should take the next step and further apply the methodology to produce a prioritized listing of military activities that address *all* of the country's objectives. For example, in order to identify which military activities are the most important to an *overall* goal of supporting theater engagement in Guatemala, the planner identifies each objective for Guatemala, breaks it down into its relevant criteria, and assesses the potential contribution of each military activity to each criterion. In essence, the planner should create a fourth level to the framework and then apply the assessment and weighting process to each level. Figure 6 illustrates how a planner would apply the methodology to Guatemala, given the notional objectives of professionalizing the military, strengthening regional military

cooperation, and improving interoperability.

Figure 6.



EXPANDED DECISION FRAMEWORK

The output of the Expert Choice tool, in this case, is a composite, prioritized list of military activity requirements to support theater engagement in Guatemala. This ranking incorporates both the CINC's priorities for Guatemala and an assessment of Guatemala's current environment. A command planning staff should, of course, apply this same methodology to each country in the theater to produce a prioritized list of requirements. With these results in hand, the command then has the analytical foundation necessary to allocate scarce military activity resources across the theater and to rationally explain and defend that allocation. In other words, the command has the information necessary to drive development of the TEP's Activity Annex.

The methodology described in this paper is best applied at the level of the theater planning staff. That's because the theater staff must ensure the identification of criteria for objectives and the assessment of the potential contribution of military activities to those criteria are applied equally across the theater. However, the U.S. Military Group (MILGP) team in the host nation should also be trained in the methodology since MILGP

personnel are the most knowledgeable about the host nation's current status. They must understand the methodology in order to ensure they provide useful country assessments to input into the decision framework.

CONCLUSION

The proposed methodology is a simple, but rigorous, way to utilize inherently subjective assessments to translate country objectives into military engagement activity requirements. By using a decision making tool like Expert Choice, the planner can rationally justify the allocation of resources across the theater and ensure that the United States achieves the biggest 'bang for its buck' in each country in its pursuit of 'shaping the international environment.' This methodology bridges the analytical gap between the TEP's Strategic Concept and Activity Annex, and ensures that theater engagement decision making is driven by objectives, and not by other factors that may produce useful, but not *optimized*, results. As Sun-Tzu wrote, "With many calculations one can win; with few one cannot. How much less chance of victory has one who makes none at all! By this means I examine the situation and the outcome will be clearly apparent."^{xx}

NOTES

ⁱ A National Security Strategy for a Global Age (Washington, DC: The White House, 2000), 1.

ⁱⁱ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Theater Engagement Planning, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01A (Washington, DC: 31 May 2000), A-1.

ⁱⁱⁱ Ibid., 1.

^{iv} Thomas M. Jordan, Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young, "Shaping" the World Through "Engagement": Assessing the Department of Defense's Theater Engagement Planning Process (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000), 9.

^v Joint Chiefs of Staff, C-3.

^{vi} Ibid., C-4.

vii U.S. military officer in SOUTHCOM, E-mail correspondence, 26 April 2001. My conclusions are based on information provided by this officer. In SOUTHCOM, military activity requirements in a specific country are primarily, but not exclusively, driven by the MILGP team. The MILGP team does provide a prioritized list of objectives and military activities to the SOUTHCOM staff that is discussed at the annual Theater Engagement Planning conference. However, the method to derive this prioritization is subjective and based, to a great deal, on host nation priorities and historical successes.

viii David G. Bradford and William W. Mendel, Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Cooperation (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), 69.

ix Group Decision Support Software Version 9.5 User Manual (Pittsburgh, PA: Expert Choice Inc., 1998), xi.

x Ibid., 57.

xi Ibid.

xii Max G. Manwaring, Security and Civil-Military Relations in the New World Disorder: The Use of Armed Forces in the Americas (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The George Bush School of Government and Public Service and the U.S. Army War College, 1999), 39.

xiii U.S. military officer in SOUTHCOM, E-mail correspondence, 26 April 2001.

xiv Ibid. The resolution was part of a much larger omnibus congressional bill that failed to pass for other reasons.

xv Margaret Daly Hayes and others, Future Naval Cooperation with Latin America: Final Report (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1994), 35.

xvi Manwaring, 45.

xvii Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, Joint Pub 3-07 (Washington, DC: 16 June 1995), III-9.

xviii Manwaring, 47.

xix Jordan, 21.

xx Sun-Tzu, The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 71.

Bibliography

Bradford, David G. and William W. Mendel. Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995.

Group Decision Support Software Version 9.5 User Manual. Pittsburgh, PA: Expert Choice Inc., 1998.

Hayes, Margaret Daly, Richard D. Kohout, Patrick H. Roth, and Gary F. Wheatley. Future Naval Cooperation with Latin America: Final Report. Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1994.

Jordan, Thomas M., Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., and Thomas-Durell Young. "Shaping" the World Through "Engagement": Assessing the Department of Defense's Theater

Engagement Planning Process. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2000.

Manwaring, Max G., ed. Security and Civil-Military Relations in the New World Disorder: The Use of Armed Forces in the Americas. Carlisle Barracks, PA: The George Bush School of Government and Public Service and the U.S. Army War College, 1999.

A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. Washington, DC: The White House, 2000.

Poucher, John D. II, Lieutenant Colonel. Theater Engagement Plan (Strategic Tool for National Security). Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2000.

Sun-Tzu. The Art of War. London: Oxford University Press, 1963.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Joint Pub 3-07. Washington, DC: 16 June 1995.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Theater Engagement Planning. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01A. Washington, DC: 31 May 2000.

U.S. Pacific Command. USCINCPAC FY2000 Country Engagement Plans. OPLAN 5300 (classified SECRET). Camp Smith, HI: 2000.

U.S. Pacific Command. USCINCPAC Theater Engagement Plan Strategic Concept (Engagement for the Asia Pacific Theater). CONPLAN 5301 (classified SECRET). Camp Smith, HI: 2000.